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Abstract In recent literature, there is disagreement over the temporal pattern of verti-
cal governance of firms over the product life-cycle.We use a novel neo-Schumpeterian
agent-based simulation model to investigate emerging patterns of vertical governance
for different levels of imitability and substitutability of capabilities.We find that, in the
mature phase of the product life-cycle, firms generally prefer vertical specialization.
However, in the early phase, imitability and substitutability, in interplay, determine
the governance form preferred. High imitability frustrates appropriation and thereby
discourages integration for synergistic advantages. However, firms need not vertically
specialize: under low substitutability, incompatibilities reduce the advantages of spe-
cialization. When both substitutability and imitability are low, firms can appropriate
the value of their inventions and there is no combinatorial advantage of specialization,
so firms predominantly integrate. If substitutability is high and imitability is low, the
combinatorial advantage of specialization balances with the synergistic advantage of
integration.
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1 Introduction
Recent research is concerned with the temporal patterns in the vertical governance1
over capabilities2 of firms over the product life-cycle (e.g. Jacobides and Winter
2005; Cacciatori and Jacobides 2005; Argyres and Bigelow 2010; Argyres and Zenger
2009). In the classical literature on the make-or-buy decision, the competitive condi-
tions remain unchanged. However, whenever the market, technology, or competition
changes, firms are likely to reconsider the vertical governance over capabilities they
(do not) have. In literature, there is disagreement onwhether being vertically integrated
or rather vertically specialized is beneficial for competitive performance, particularly
during the early phase of a product life-cycle when there is considerable turmoil on
the product market. According to Afuah (2001), Jacobides and Winter (2005) and
Fine (1998), vertical integration is preferred because this allows efficient research and
development, facilitates horizontal differentiation and breaking away from existing
technological paradigms, and enhances knowledge absorption. According to Harrigan
(1985) and Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt (1986), vertical specialization is preferred
because it allows flexible recombination with alternative complements provided by
specialized entrants, thus prevents being locked in into a certain product design while
reaping positive scale economies and benefits of component competition.
Arguably, the disparity in the vertical governance pattern over the product life-cycle
relates to differences in characteristics of technological capabilities and the products
produced.Whenever products are technologically complexwithmany intricately inter-
acting components (e.g. first generations of computers), the first ones to be developed
and produced have unique, integrated designs. Only over time, firms seek to commodi-
tize products by modularization, outsourcing of component production to dedicated
suppliers, etc. (Baldwin and Clark 2000). Whenever products are inherently modu-
lar or have separable production steps (e.g. apparel), firms are reluctant to vertically
integrate even in the early stages of development. In any case, with the emergence of
a dominant design, there is a tendency to modularize, vertically specialize, and out-
source component production (cf. Baldwin and Clark 2000). That said, though, there
are ample cases in which an industry persistently accommodates a mix of governance
forms. Fine (1998) provides an elaborate discussion of the case of the personal com-
puter. Although personal computers were initially integrated products, progressive
modularization to reap positive economies of scale led to the formation of a vertically
specialized consortium of Microsoft, Intel, and IBM. The emerging product design
allowed consumers to combine components (‘plug-and-play’) and thus facilitated a
swarm-in of specialized firms producing software, chips, peripheral hardware, etc.,
1 With ‘governance’we refer to the legal vertical scope over capabilities of a firm. For a detailed introduction
of ‘vertical governance’, we refer the reader to the seminal work of Williamson (1981, 1985).
2 For the remainder of this paper, we use ‘capabilities’ to refer to the set of knowledge and skills to develop
and produce a particular product.
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thereby offering many options to consumers. Despite the dominance of the modular
product design and the associated vertical specialization in the personal computer
industry, Apple created a persistent niche of a vertically integrated design in which
software and hardware are highly attuned, thus offering higher quality products, yet
limiting the entry and competition at the component level.
In this paper, we take a capability-based perspective on governance decisions. Our
contention is that differences in the temporal pattern in vertical governance forms
chosen, and notably during the early phases of the life-cycle, are due to differences
in substitutability and imitability of production capabilities (cf. Teece et al. 1997;
Barney 1991). We study the patterns of vertical governance over the product life-
cycle and how these patterns change with capability properties.3 We provide a novel
neo-Schumpeterian agent-based simulationmodel to analyze the effects of these capa-
bility properties on the governance forms that evolutionary emerge. The agent-based
model features a two-tier industry with component producers (suppliers) operating
on the upstream tier, system producers (assemblers) operating on the downstream tier
buying components and selling a final system to end-consumers, and firms that pro-
duce both. Firms search in a multi-dimensional space of capabilities (Gilbert et al.
2001, 2007), and combine system and component production capabilities (either fully
in-house or by teaming up with a firm providing complementary capabilities) to pro-
duce products.4 We ensure that common stylized facts of the product life-cycle for
homogeneous products (i.e. swarm-in/shake-out of firms, an alternating pattern of
technological turmoil and convergence in technology, and profit erosion) are repro-
duced. We experimentally vary the imitability and substitutability of capabilities and
study the evolutionary emerging governance pattern over the product life-cycle as
dependent variable. The cost structure (economies of scale in production, switching
costs, research costs) is the mediating variable.
We find that, in the mature phase of the product life-cycle, firms generally prefer
vertical specialization. In the early phase, however, no single governance form domi-
nates. High imitability frustrates appropriation and thereby integration for synergistic
advantages. However, firms need not vertically specialize: under low substitutability,
incompatibilities reduce the advantages of specialization. When both substitutabil-
ity and imitability are low, firms can appropriate the value of their inventions and
there is no combinatorial advantage of specialization, so firms predominantly inte-
grate. If substitutability is high and imitability is low, the combinatorial advantage
of specialization balances with the synergistic advantage of integration. Ultimately,
we conclude that an integrated conceptual framework containing both imitability and
substitutability is required to determine whether firms vertically specialize to be able
3 Although we acknowledge that different capabilities in one and the same industry may have different
substitutability and imitability, we study the case that an industry has a certain capability ‘regime’ in the
sense that all capabilities in the industry have the same level of imitability and substitutability.
4 Since there are ‘firms’ onboth tiers of a supply chain and they all produce ‘products’,we say that ‘suppliers’
on the upstream tier produce ‘components’ which are then used by ‘system producers’/‘assemblers’ to
produce the final product (‘system’) then sold to the end-consumers. We use ‘firm’ and ‘product’ only when
we refer to both upstream and downstream firms and products, or when additional information clarifies
which one we mean. Furthermore, if we use ‘product’ in the general sense (so, the product made upstream
or downstream), we use ‘complement’ to refer to the other product (so, downstream respectively upstream).
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to switch to alternative complements or rather vertically integrate to fine-tune system
and components.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we discuss literature on the prod-
uct life-cycle and formulate hypotheses on how capability properties imitability and
substitutability affect governance decisions in the different phases of the product life-
cycle. In Sect. 3, we define our neo-Schumpeterian agent-based simulation model. In
Sect. 4, we present, analyze, and interpret the simulation results. In Sect. 5, we briefly
summarize our findings, draw conclusions, and discuss avenues for further research.
2 Literature
We discuss the literature on the product life-cycle, particularly characterizing the
competitive challenges. We then elaborate on the (dis)advantages of the governance
form in searching for high performing (combinations of) capabilities. Next, we discuss
how the imitability and substitutability of capabilities mediate how governance affects
search. Finally, we formulate hypotheses on the governance form in the different
phases of the product life-cycle in general and for different levels of imitability and
substitutability in particular.
2.1 Product life-cycle
Contingency models of the industry evolution (e.g. Levitt 1965; Wasson 1974; Utter-
back and Abernathy 1975) describe the pattern of interlocking evolution of demand,
competitive activities, and technology research and development. The evolution of
industries with homogeneous demand5 is expected to abide by the cycle of technolog-
ical change (cf. Malerba 2006) of the alternating era of ferment after a breakthrough
technology and era of incremental change following the emergence of a dominant
design (Anderson and Tushman 1990; Tushman and Anderson 1986). In the era of
ferment, entrepreneurs compete on different product-market propositions. In the era
of incremental change, firms follow the dominant design and rival for consumers’
demand by price competition through cost reduction, efficiency increases, and process
innovation. With a further erosion of profit margins, firms seek to develop the next
generation of products with, again, high profit margins. This radical breakthrough
innovation triggers a new onset phase.
Various authors (e.g. Klepper 1997;Murmann and Frenken 2006) have stressed that
the existing contingency models of industry evolution lack a vertical orientation, i.e.
do not account for upstream industry conditions that affect the industry development.
Recently, scholars engaged in describing the governance patterns over the product
life-cycle (cf. Fine 1998; Jacobides and Winter 2005; Cacciatori and Jacobides 2005;
Argyres andBigelow 2010; Argyres and Zenger 2009).We follow these organizational
economists in that both capability-based concerns and cost-based concerns and their
5 Under heterogeneous demand, firms may also pursue product differentiation. Under these circumstances,
a segregated market may emerge with a ‘dominant design’ per niche rather than for the whole industry (cf.
Bonaccorsi and Giuri 2000; Windrum and Birchenhall 1998; Malerba 2006).
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dynamic interplay determine the governance form. However, our explicit contention
is that during the era of ferment, the emphasis is on R&D such that governance deci-
sions are dominated by capability-based concerns, while, during the era of incremental
search, the emphasis is on manufacturing such that governance decisions are domi-
nated by cost-based concerns. From organization ecological perspective (cf. Duysters
1995; Hannan and Freeman 1977) we know that also the type of firms evolves over
the industry life-cycle. During the era of ferment, the population consists of many
specialized entrepreneurs that compete on product performance and respond swiftly
to opportunities, while, in the era of incremental change, the population consists of a
few large manufacturing firms that exploit scale advantages of mass-production.
2.2 Governance form and search
In our simulation model, we adopt the knowledge-based perspective on product inno-
vation (Gilbert et al. 2001, 2007) in which firms look for new capabilities or a new
combination of capabilities to produce new, superior products. To realize competitive
products, up- and downstream capabilities need to be attuned.
Froma theoretical perspective, both governance forms have advantages in searching
for a competitive combination of capabilities.
Firstly, there is a synergistic advantage of integration (Schilling 2000). Whenever a
firm is vertically integrated, internal communication and cross-fertilization of knowl-
edge is efficient. Input component and system technology can be closely attuned during
development such that there is high internal compatibility (cf. Kogut and Zander 1992;
Afuah 2001). An additional advantage is that integration excludes rivals from using
the same input or system and ensures that the generated value is appropriated by its
(integrated) inventor.
Secondly, there is a combinatorial advantage of specialization. Whenever firms are
vertically specialized in a modular design, they can link up with alternative comple-
ment providers without having to engage in time consuming or costly redesign. For
instance, a system producer can switch to an alternative (vertically specialized) input
supplier to realize a new combination of capabilities (cf. Schilling and Steensma 2001;
Dyer and Singh 1998). In case there are many suppliers that search independently for
capabilities, system producers can consider more combinations than when vertically
integrated. Furthermore, suppliers may trade with or be approached by more than one
assembler, thus increasing their chances of sales. Vertical specialization thus allows
decentralized search of many combinations.
So, vertical integration allows attuning for high performance plus appropriation of
generated value, while vertical specialization allows recombination with components
becoming available due to decentralized search. Note that vertical integration need
not be a merger of two firms; a firm can vertically integrate forward or backward by
either buying or developing the production capabilities needed.
2.3 Properties of the capability regime
A firm has a competitive advantage of owning a particular capability if this capability
is valuable and rare, and hard to imitate and substitute (Barney 1991). In this study,
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we focus on imitability and substitutability. Imitability refers to the extent of efforts
(costs, dedicated time, or other resources) needed to imitate capabilities. Substitutabil-
ity refers to the extent to which swapping one capability for another is likely to affect
overall performance (conditioned on values of both capabilities). Here, we formulate
hypotheses on why firms would vertically specialize or integrate for different levels
of substitutability and imitability.
Firstly, if substitutability is high, capabilities are modular, and swapping one com-
ponent (system) for another component (system) capability is likely to yield few
compatibility issues. The more substitutable (more modular/less complex) capabili-
ties, themore eager firms are to specialize (cf. Argyres andBigelow 2006; Sanchez and
Mahoney 1996). Alternatively, if component and system capabilities are complexly
interwoven or finely attuned, swapping one for an arbitrary other capability is likely to
lead to compatibility problems and thereby deter overall performance. In this case, ver-
tical integration allows attuning upstream and downstream capabilities to arrive at an
integrated, competitive product, while specialization and relying on external capabili-
ties is likely to yield products whose performance is low due to incompatibilities. So,
with a decrease in substitutability (increase in complexity), the combinatorial advan-
tage of specialization decreases and the synergistic advantage of integration increases.
Note that, due to these incompatibilities, integration as exclusion instrument is less
important. The lower substitutability, the less valuable combinatorial search, and the
less likely firms are to pursue vertical specialization (the more likely firms are to pur-
sue integrated search). We expect this effect to become stronger if imitability drops,
because appropriability increases for integrated firms.
Secondly, if imitability is high, the synergistic advantage of being integrated
reduces.After all, if capabilities can be imitated relatively easily and relatively cheaply,
the additional performance achieved by tight vertical governance vanishes with the
swiftly followed imitation. Also the combinatorial advantage of being specialized
reduces as (integrated) firms can quickly imitate a high performing combination found
by other firms. Conclusively, if imitability is high, both advantages are relatively weak.
However, by specializing, firms still enjoy decentralized search and consider more
combinations than when fully integrated. Alternatively, if imitability is low, integra-
tion is an effective exclusion and appropriation instrument, whereas specialization
allows competitors to access the same (possibly superior) upstream capabilities. Note
that exclusion is less of a reason to integrate if those capabilities are of limited value for
competitors. So, the value of arbitrary complementary capabilities drops whenever the
substitutability drops. A system (component) producer does not need to exclude com-
peting system (component) producers from accessing the same component (system)
producer as they are likely to encounter compatibility issues anyhow.
Table1 contains the hypotheses on the governance form sought under different
levels of imitability and substitutability respectively as inferred above. In the on-
diagonal cells, there is consensus, while, in the off-diagonal cells, there is ambiguity
due to conflicting implications.
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Table 1 Governance forms as predicted by imitability and substitutability
Substitutability
Low High
Imitability
Low H1: Integration for
exclusion/appropriation
H1: Integration for
exclusion/appropriation versus
specialization to link w. top capabilities
H2: Integration for attuning,
specialization suffers incompatibilities
H2: Specialization for decentralized
search
High H1: Specialization for decentralized
search
H1&2: Specialization for decentralized
search
H2: Integration for attuning,
specialization suffers incompatibilities
There is ambiguity on the governance form in the off-diagonal cells. In the era of incremental change
2.4 Governance in different eras
Recent research is concerned with the temporal patterns in the vertical scope of firms
over the product life-cycle (e.g. Fine 1998; Jacobides andWinter 2005; Cacciatori and
Jacobides 2005; Argyres and Bigelow 2010; Argyres and Zenger 2009). According
to the cycle of technological change (Anderson and Tushman 1990; Tushman and
Anderson 1986), the industry alternates between the eras of ferment and incremental
change, punctuated by the emerge of a dominant design and a radical breakthrough. In
each of these eras, the market, competitive and technological conditions differ, and so
are the concerns in deciding on a governance form. Table1 needs further specification
for each of the two eras.
2.4.1 Era of ferment
In the era of ferment, i.e. in the early phase of the PLC just after the radical break-
through, the emphasis in firm activity is on research and development of new products.
Entrants and incumbents frequently discover new component and assembly proposi-
tions and frequently bring new products to the market. So, during this era, there is
a high risk that technological change proves in-house capabilities inferior. In that
case, firms have to link up with (by switching to another supplier) or acquire supe-
rior capabilities (by imitation or absorption). This high risk of obsolescence and need
for flexibility calls for vertical specialization (cf. Harrigan 1985; Balakrishnan and
Wernerfelt 1986; Schilling and Steensma 2001; Afuah 2000). So, each firm thus faces
a—what we call—‘high stakes/high gains’ governance dilemma. A firm has to choose
between, firstly, vertical integration to synergistically attune component and assem-
bly at the risk of obsolescence, or, secondly, vertical specialization to enable flexible
recombinatorial search but suffer incompatibilities. As there often is ambiguity, firms
cannot always choose between becoming an ‘opportunistic specialist-combiner’ or a
‘synergistic integrated developer’.
123
B. Vermeulen et al.
If substitutability is high, flexible recombination is relatively valuable. If sub-
stitutability is low, the probability that a complement at the market yields a high
performing product is low. Under low imitability, firms can effectively appropriate
market value, so integration to reach a high performance is more valuable. The propen-
sity to vertically integrate decreases with imitability.
2.4.2 Era of incremental change
In the era of incremental change, i.e. in the growth and mature phases of the PLC just
after the emergence of the dominant design, firms face relatively stationary demand
on the medium-long term and focus on large scale production. Technological changes
are rare, such that firm may have dedicated manufacturing facilities. Consequently,
firms pick the governance form primarily based on production and transaction costs.
Firms outsource production if there are positive economies of scale in production in
an upstream sector (cf. Stigler 1951), if there are diseconomies of scope (Prahalad and
Hamel 1990), or positive economies of specialization (cf. Smith 2003). In general,
transaction costs and diseconomies of scope mediate the appeal of specialization and
integration in obvious directions: e.g. existence of positive economies of scale in the
upstream sector promotes vertical specialization.
Given that technological change is infrequent, firms do not need to imitate or sub-
stitute capabilities. As such, the effect of regime properties is limited.
3 Neo-Schumpeterian model
In this section, we provide the specifications of our neo-Schumpeterian agent-based
model. Section3.1 contains a brief overview of the basic ideas behind the simulation
model. In Sect. 3.2, we explain the functional design of the simulation model. In the
remaining subsections, we discuss the actual operational implementation.
3.1 Overview
Here we briefly discuss the basic ideas underlying the functional design of and the
operationalizations in the simulation model, notably (i) that we seek to reproduce
stylized facts of the product life-cycle, (ii) how our model extends the classical
PLC, (iii) that product renewal through capability and product search interlocks with
diffusion–substitution in consumer demand, (iv) how we seek to ‘evolutionary train’
the governance strategy, and (v) the experimental setup to investigate the effects of
capability regime properties on emerging governance patterns.
To study the emerging vertical governance pattern over the product life-cycle, we
specify a neo-Schumpeterian model that reproduces the classical PLC in which the
industry alternates between two distinct phases of competition, separated by the emer-
gence of a dominant design and a radical breakthrough (Utterback and Abernathy
1975; Anderson and Tushman 1990). In the early phase (era of ferment), the firm pop-
ulation consists of ‘entrepreneurial’ firms that focus on product innovation and run
flexible job shops. In themature phase (era of incremental change), the firm population
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Fig. 1 Graphical illustration of
the industry structure. Here, one
supplier provides components to
two system assemblers, and
there is one integrated firm
Consumers
System
assemblers
Input
producers
consists of ‘mass-manufacturing’ firms that operate dedicated, large scale production
equipment. Typical simulation results (see Sect. 4) of our neo-Schumpeterian model
feature distinct eras of ferment and of incremental change and reproduce the stylized
facts of swarm-in/shake-out, turbulence/convergence in product technology, and profit
erosion.
However, in our model, we move away from the traditional single tier models
of an industry and rather have a two-tier industry. At the downstream tier, system
producers/assemblers produce systems to be sold to consumers. At the upstream tier,
firms produce components that are input into the system that is made downstream. A
vertically integrated firm produces the system and the input component. A vertically
specialized systemproducer buys components fromavertically specialized component
producer. Figure1 illustrates the industry structure.
In any neo-Schumpeterian agent-basedmodel, firms compete for consumer demand
through product innovation and price setting. Following the SKIN model (see e.g.
Gilbert et al. 2001, 2007), firms look for new capabilities or a new combination of
capabilities to produce new, superior products. In Sect. 3.4, we describe howfirmswith
different governance forms search an upstream and a downstream capability landscape
for new capabilities and combine these capabilities to make products. A vertically
integrated firm explores combinations of the system and component capabilities that
it owns, fully in-house. A vertically specialized firm explores combinations of its
own capabilities with complementary capabilities owned by potential partners. The
capabilities are combined to produce products that are then launched, dynamically
priced, and ultimately withdrawn from the market following the heuristics described
in Sect. 3.5. In Sect. 3.6, we describe how consumers buy products based on price and
performance, their individual willingness-to-buy, and word-of-mouth.
Given that firms incur costs for searching, producing, and changing production,
only firms that follow strategies that efficiently generate superior products will survive
competition in the long run. The firms in our model follow three different strategies:
the business strategy (whether and when to be mass-manufacturer or entrepreneur),
the product search strategy (when to explore or rather imitate, when to conduct radical
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Fig. 2 Flowchart of industry evolution with evolutionary learning of strategy
search), and the vertical governance strategy (when to vertically integrate or special-
ize). In Sect. 3.3, we describe the operationalization of these strategies in detail. The
strategies of superior firms are imitated by entrants to establish ‘evolutionary learning’
(at the population level) of these strategies. A flowchart of this industry evolution with
evolutionary learning of strategies is given in Fig. 2.
In the present work, firms learn two strategy variables6: the governance form (inte-
grated/specialized) before and after the emergence of the dominance design.
The industry level parameters (production costs, diffusion rate, periodic costs, etc.)
are treated as mediating variables. The agents’ decision variables (decision thresholds
are discussed later) are taken constant and equal for all agents. By homogenizing
firms in this way, evolution trains just the governance strategy. The values chosen for
mediating variables and strategy decisions parameters are given in “Appendix 1”. In
Sect. 4.1.2, we discuss our parameter choices in detail.
3.2 Functional design
Our neo-Schumpeterian agent-based model is a discrete periodic simulation model.
In each period, there are four consecutive stages of activities: a sales round, a round
of strategic activities (in which firms may change the business model and/or their
governance form), a round of operational capability and product search, and an entry
and exit round.
6 In extensive experimentation with this model, several other strategy variables (e.g. the thresholds in the
business strategy defining when firms switch from being an entrepreneur to being a mass-manufacturer,
also the thresholds in the product search strategy defining when firms imitate rather than explore, etc.) were
endogenously trained. However, there was only slow convergence in these strategies and the simulation
results displayed substantial noise due to overparameterization.
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Firstly, there is a sales round in which (i) firms select products they will produce
and the prices at which they will be sold, and (ii) consumers share experiences and
determine what to buy. As described in Sect. 3.5, firms launch new products by giving
away promotional units and thus start diffusion–substitution. Moreover, firms remove
products that are not consumed anymore or because they are old-fashioned (products of
the newest-but-two generation are phased out). Firms set prices of currently produced
products by conducting a poll among consumers. As described in Sect. 3.6, consumers
consume part of their products, and—if in need of a new unit of product—consult
a panel of other consumers (which thus operationalizes word-of-mouth) on which
product to buy. Once consumers are aware of the existence of a new generation of
products, they become increasingly eager to buy these products. Consumers pick a
particular product based on the recommendations of consumers in a panel.
Secondly, as described in Sect. 3.3, firms follow their business, governance, and
capability and product search strategies. The capability search strategy is ‘exploration’,
‘imitation’, or ‘radical search’ depending on market concentration, profit margin, and
the gap in performance between own and competing products. If a firm is in imitation
mode (step-by-step development of the capability of a competitor) or conducting rad-
ical search, the firm will finish that before following business or governance strategic
actions. If a firm is in exploratory mode, the firm consults its business strategy and
may set the business model to ‘entrepreneur’ or ‘mass-manufacturer’ depending on
the market share of the product design. If a firm switches from one to another busi-
ness strategy, it will also immediately vertically integrate or outsource in line with the
governance strategy of that new business model.
Thirdly, as described in Sect. 3.4, firms also conduct operational search for new
capabilities on a capability landscape. The capabilities found are then combined into
new products, either in-house for integrated firms or with another firm upstream or
downstream for vertically specialized firms. A vertically specialized firm will also
consider all new combinations if a complement producer discovers a new capability.
A product thus developed is eligible for production and market entry if (i) the product
portfolio does not already contain it, the portfolio is not full or the product’s perfor-
mance exceeds that of another product currently in the portfolio that it can replace,
(ii) an estimate of the willingness-to-pay exceeds the production costs, and (iii) it is
the first of a new generation or its performance exceeds that of the current top product
on the market.
Fourthly, as described in Sect. 3.7, at the end of each period, firms that are bankrupt
do exit (unless it is the last firm in the industry). Moreover, there is a firm waiting
outside the industry which decides whether or not to enter.
3.3 Strategies
Each firm follows three strategies: a business strategy, a capability search strategy,
and a vertical governance strategy. Following Anderson and Tushman (1990), we have
firms change their business model upon the technological punctuations (emergence
of dominant design, discovery of a radical breakthrough). Operationally, each agent
has its own preferred governance form with either one of the business models. The
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business strategy, capability landscape search strategy, and the vertical governance
are only reconsidered whenever the firm is engaged in exploration. Whenever the firm
is engaged in imitation, differentiation, or radical search, the firm first finishes that
search operation. We now describe these three strategies in detail.
3.3.1 Business strategy
We distinguish two types of agents: entrepreneurs and mass-manufacturers. An entre-
preneur is focused on technological exploration and runs a job shop with versatile
production facilities. Production switching is relatively cheap, but the fixed unit costs
for production are high. A mass-manufacturer is focused on large scale production
and runs a dedicated mass-production facility. Production switching is expensive, but
the fixed unit cost for production are low.
Following Utterback and Abernathy (1975), Anderson and Tushman (1990) and
Klepper (1996), we assume that during the early phase of the product life-cycle, the
firms primarily follow an entrepreneurial strategy, while as soon as a dominant design
emerges, the firms switch to a mass-manufacturing strategy. Operationally, the firm
agents switch based on the design dominance metric Hˆ (defined in Sect. 3.7), which
simply quantifies how many consumers of the total consume a particular product. If
Hˆ > H0, we say a particular design is dominant. Given that Hˆ is volatile and may
hence cross H0 repeatedly, we assume that there is a margin 0 < m  1 and that
only if Hˆ exceeds H0 + m, firms become manufacturers, and if Hˆ < H0 − m, firms
become entrepreneurs.
Firms can producemultiple generations of products. However, we assume that firms
are entrepreneurial in the era of ferment of a new generation and (at the same time)
mass-producing in the era of incremental search in the old generation. As soon as
the new generation of products is phased-in in mass-production, the old generation of
products—if still produced—is discontinued. Moreover, we assume that, as soon as a
firm engages in exploration in a new generation of capabilities, the firm will pick the
governance form that is beneficial for the entrepreneurial activities.
3.3.2 Capability search strategy
Firms have a capability search strategy that prescribes whether to (i) explore capabil-
ities to produce a product with a higher performance, (ii) imitate capabilities to make
a top product, or (iii) develop capabilities needed to produce a product of the next
generation. In a homogenous product market, as we study in this paper, firms do not
have a way to differentiate their product for a niche market.
The first consideration in what search heuristic to follow is that the firm (here:
system assembler or integrated firm) continues exploration if the industry is premature,
i.e. whenever there is no competing product or the performance of the best product
is low. In a premature industry, firms continue searching for a product that is good
enough to ultimately capture a large share of the market. If a competitor’s top product
has performance that exceeds the performance of a focal firm by far, that focal firm
starts imitating the capabilities needed to produce that top product. A supplier follows
the same rationale but then for the component. In case the firm is an entrepreneur
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(manufacturer), and if the performance of another product is ≥5% (≥15%, which is
higher because of higher switching costs) higher than the performance of his own
product, the entrepreneur (manufacturer) will engage in imitation.
If the industry is mature but the competing top product is not good enough for
imitation, the firm (here: assembler, supplier, or integrated firm) considers radical
search. The firm will engage in radical search if one of three conditions holds. Firstly,
the firm is a ‘laggard’,whichweoperationally define as that the firm is not yet active in a
new generation of product technologywhilemore than half of the consumers is already
buying products of a new(er) generation. Secondly, the profitability of the current top
performing product of the generation produced by the focal firm is negative. Thirdly,
the smoothened profit margin is lower than a particular threshold (we picked 0.05,
i.e. if the profit margin drops below 5%) and while the smoothened design dominance
is higher than a particular threshold (we picked 0.80, i.e. one product technology is
consumed by more than 80% of the consumers already). The design considerations
for this third option are that if a certain technology is already dominant and the profit
is low, there are insufficient opportunities in this industry. In that case, a firm will
rather try to discover a new generation of products with more opportunities. If these
conditions do not hold (so there are enough opportunities, there still is a sufficiently
high profitmargin, and the own performance is relatively high), then the firm continues
local exploration.
The procedure that firms follow to determine their search strategy is depicted in the
flowchart in Fig. 3.
3.3.3 Vertical governance strategy
Whenever a firm is engaged in exploratory search (so, not imitating or engaged in
radical search), the firm changes its vertical governance according to the following
simple heuristics. If an assembler does not find a supplier, or a supplier does not find
an assembler, it will vertically integrate. So, this is not a merger of equals, but is the
acquisition and in-house development of production capabilities.
In any other case, the firm picks the governance form related to the business model.
In the era of ferment, i.e. prior to the emergence of the dominant design, the focal firm
is entrepreneurial and picks the governance form for that business model. Similarly,
after the emergence of the dominant design, the focal firm is a mass-manufacturer
and picks the governance form for the era of incremental change. These two gover-
nance form specifications are the only two variables that are endogenously trained.
As explained before, we limited the number of strategy variables trained to overcome
slow convergence and noise in simulation results.
Whenever an integrated firm vertically specializes, it specializes in the tier in which
it has the highest performing capability. Whenever an integrated firm becomes an
assembler, this assembler links up with an existing supplier if this supplier provides
the currently used or an even better component, but otherwise spins off its component
capabilities to a newly established supplier with whom it then links. Similarly, when-
ever an integrated firm becomes a supplier and does not find an assembler with whom
it can make the same product or a product with higher performance, this firm spins off
its system production facilities to a newly established assembler with whom it then
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Fig. 3 The search strategy determines when to explore freely, imitate the top product/component/assembly
or to engage in radical research to unlock the next generation of capabilities
links. From thatmoment onward both specialized firms follow their own (autonomous)
heuristics that further improve their respective performances. The outsourcing agent
considers switching to another supplier already the next period.
Upon integration, the firm acquires the complementary capabilities of its current
production chain partner(s) and continues to produce the products, but now fully in-
house.
Note that while there is a threshold triggering a governance decision, firms need not
change their governance form, so firmsmay remain vertically integrated or specialized
over the whole product life-cycle.
The costs of integration and outsourcing are discussed in Sect. 3.8.
3.4 Capability and product search
Following the SKINmodel (Gilbert et al. 2001; Pyka et al. 2009), firms conduct a two-
stage search. In the first stage, firms search on the capability landscape for new viable
capabilities. In the second stage, firms recombine readily discovered component and
system capabilities into product propositions, whereby integrated firms do so exclu-
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sively in-house, while vertically specialized firms collaborate with firms providing
complementary capabilities. We now discuss both search stages.
3.4.1 Landscape search for capabilities
In the first stage, firms search on the capability landscape for capabilities. There are two
capability landscapes (for each generation of products): one for system capabilities
and one for component capabilities. We encode a capability as an alphabetic string of
length N capability dimensions, each with D options. We take a capability to be a mix
of techniques, capital goods, and skills/abilities to produce a certain output product. As
soon as a focal firm finds a capability that is a local optimum in terms of performance
and that is new to this firm, the firm adds it to its capability repository. We use the
metaphor of the reels in a gambling slot machine (see Fig. 4): there are N reels (capa-
bility dimensions) with D pictures (specific skills/abilities/techniques/resources). At
each tier, the firm is looking for capabilities in the space of size DN possible capabil-
ities.
With regard to the performance of capabilities,we follow the island-sea landscape of
Fagiolo andDosi (2003). The ‘sea’ is formed by a bigmajority of the capabilities (each
a unique combination of abilities, techniques, skills, etc.) that has a zero performance
(i.e. technologically infeasible). The few capabilities that have non-zero performance
are the randomly scattered ‘islands’. The sea has to be ‘sailed’ to reach the islands.
During generation of the capability landscape, we randomly select C combinations
that are feasible (so we have C islands) and have a non-zero performance, and set the
remaining DN −C capabilities to have a performance of zero.7 From innovation size
distribution studies (e.g. Silverberg and Verspagen 2003), we infer that combinations
7 At first, we drew a performance value for each of the DN combinations.We found that the capabilitieswith
very low performance were used only very rarely and only very briefly (until replaced by capabilities with
higher performance). So, the effect of the capabilities with very low performance was limited. Truncating
the very low performance values of the DN − C capabilities to zero, and thereby adopting the island-sea
landscape, we shortened the computation time dramatically. Switching to an island-sea structure of the
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Fig. 5 Flowchart of operational landscape search in which the experimental capability is manipulated to
find new feasible capabilities by trial-and-error
that are feasible have a certain performance distribution. We assume that, of the C
feasible capabilities, capability i has a performance q equal to e−αuβ ∈ [0, 1] where
u ∼ U [0, 1] is a uniform random variable. We tune this distribution with parameters
α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0 to ensure that a large share of the capabilities has low perfor-
mance, while a small share of the capabilities has high performance (cf. Silverberg
and Verspagen 2003).
During exploration, the focal firm searches this landscape by changing one ability
at a time of its experimental capability proposition, i.e. by turning one capability reel
in Fig. 4 up or down one step at a time. If a capability is technologically feasible,
i.e. has a performance higher than zero, it is added to the capability repository and is
considered during the first stage of combinatorial product search (which is described
in detail below). The process of capability landscape search is depicted in the flowchart
in Fig. 5. We assume that firms have fixed search costs.
3.4.2 Combinatorial search for product proposition
By the operational search on the capability landscape, a firm discovers production
capabilities that are added to its ‘repository’. Firms subsequently combine a system
and a component production capability into a ‘product proposition’. Whenever an
integrated firm discovers a new capability, it considers all combinations of this new
capability with the complementary capabilities of the same generation currently in its
repository. Whenever an assembler discovers a new system capability, it considers all
new combinations with capabilities of suppliers by enumeration. Whenever a supplier
discovers a new component capability, assemblers contact the supplier to evaluate all
new combinations. This procedure is depicted in the flowchart in Fig. 6.
Firms start production (of their component or system, or the whole product) if
the formed product proposition has a performance that is competitive with products
already on the market. We assume that if either one of the capabilities is infeasible
or produces a poorly performing component or system, the product will have a low
performance. The performance of a product is high only if both the component and
the system capability are technologically feasible and they are compatible.
Footnote 7 continued
capability landscape goes at the expense of having to add an additional parameter C for the number of
islands.
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Fig. 6 Flowchart of combinatorial search for products by combining capabilities already discovered
To operationalize this interaction, we take the multiplication of the performances8
and the compatibility. The skewed nature of the total performance due to the multipli-
cations is corrected by taking the third root. We thus get the following expression for
the overall performance q of a product:
q = g + 3
√
qSi q
I
j ci j . (1)
Hereby, qSi (q
C
j ) is the performance of the system i (component j) in [0, 1], g is the
generation of both component and system (which is described later when discussing
radical search), and ci j is the compatibility j and system i .
3.4.3 Compatibility and experimental variable substitutability
Following the landscape metaphor for capabilities, the compatibility ci j of the com-
ponent and the system relates inversely to the ‘distance’ δi j of the ‘locations’ (the
alphabetic encodings) of component and system. We use the Lee (1958) measure L,
which is the minimum number of one-step manipulations required to change one loca-
8 This is in contrast to the arithmetic mean of the performances sometimes used [e.g. the NK landscape
model (Kauffman 1993)], in which a poorly performing performance of one can be compensated by a
high performance of another, which is not realistic in non-modular products. Moreover, with an increase in
the number of summands, there is a convergence in total performance [something akin to the complexity
catastrophe in Kauffman (1993).].
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tion code into another. We assume that compatibility drops with distance and that the
relative magnitude of the drop is a negative constant. As such, the compatibility is an
exponential function:
ci j = e−x δi j with δi j := 2L(si , s j )
ND
. (2)
The si (s j ) is the (alphabetic) string for system i (component j). The distance δi j is
normalized by using that ND/2 is the maximum Lee distance. Complexity x deter-
mines the level of substitutability of components (and systems) for one another in a
given product. If x = 0, the components are perfectly interchangeable (as are the sys-
tems), as there is no effect on the overall product performance by doing so. The higher
x > 0 is, the more sensitive overall product performance becomes to the compatibil-
ity (distance) of component and system. We use this complexity x as if the inverse of
substitutability and treat it as one of our two independent variables.
3.4.4 Effect of the governance form on search
From the perspective of capability search, both governance forms (vertically inte-
grated, specialized) have their advantages. A vertically specialized assembler has the
advantage of being able to combine with all component capabilities offered by—
potentiallymany—suppliers.As all of these suppliers are searching for and also finding
component capabilities, the number of capabilities on offer also quickly grows. This
is the combinatorial advantage as discussed in Sect. 2.3.
A vertically integrated firm has the advantage of having control over looking for
component and system capabilities that are a proper fit. We model such a synergis-
tic advantage by having an integrated firm look for components on the capability
landscape tier in the alphabetic neighborhood of the system capability. The second
advantage is that the integrated firm does not need to rely on suppliers that may go
bankrupt after which the assembler has to switch to using possibly less compatible
components. From the compatibility formula (2), it is apparent that the ‘synergistic
advantages’ of integrated search are particularly great whenever substitutability is low
(complexity x is high).
3.4.5 Radical search and multiple generations of product technology
Given economic conditions specified later, firms engage in radical search to unlock a
new landscape for the next generation of products. As consumers are willing to pay
more for the new generation of products, there is a potential reward for firms to engage
in radical search. The performance of a component and system of generation g lies in
the range [0, 1], and the performance of the whole product is in the range [g, g + 1].
3.4.6 Imitation
Imitation is operationally defined as manipulating the experimental combination of
capability dimensions (abilities, skills, techniques, equipment) to decrease the distance
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from the experimental to the target capability. The probability of a successful step
in the direction of the system/component capability is i , where i is the imitability
rate. The imitability i is, just as complexity x , an independent variable in this paper.
Consequently, given that the starting point on the landscape and the capability to
be imitated are uncorrelated, the expected number of periods required to imitate the
capability is N4i
(
D − 1D odd 1D
)
. The higher we set imitability i , the lower is the expected
number of periods needed to imitate the target capability. This imitability i is one of
our two independent variables.
3.5 Product launch, pricing, and withdrawal
Each firm active on the consumer market has a portfolio of products that it actually
produces and possibly sells on the market. If search yields a new product proposition,
the firm evaluates whether it is eligible for production and, if so, adds it to the product
portfolio. A product proposition is eligible for production if it outperforms one of the
currently produced products or there is still room in the otherwise limited product
portfolio. Moreover, the product must have a profit margin that is estimated to be
positive. The flowchart for this procedure is found in Fig. 7.
If a firm has not yet produced and sold a particular product before, it has to start
up production (for which a fixed cost is incurred) and launch it by giving promotional
units to a number of consumers. These consumers will thus (possibly) drive further
diffusion–substitution.
A selling firm (i.e. fully integrated or assembler) withdraws a product from the
market and removes it from its portfolio if there has been no sales in the current period
and there are no potential future sales. Note that also sales by any of the competitors of
the same product or consumers currently still consuming the product forms potential
future sales.
Firms set the price upon the product launch such that the value-for-money of the
product (performance divided by price) is equal to the average value-for-money of
products currently on the market. The rationale is that overpricing will stifle diffusion,
while dramatic underpricingwould hurt revenue toomuch. In case it is the first product
on the market, the price is set to the maximum willingness-to-pay p∗.
Fig. 7 The flowchart for deciding on whether or not to start producing a particular product
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Fig. 8 The flowchart for product pricing process by polling consumers
Each period, each firm conducts a poll for each of its products to determine whether
to change the price or not. In this poll, the firm randomly draws a fixed number B of
consumers from the population of consumers that currently consumes any product of
the same product generation. The firm then asks each consumer the probability that
it would buy the product in case of three scenarios: the price remains the same, is
increased a little, and is decreased a little. These probabilities are in fact determined
by the discrete choice model discussed later. The firm then maximizes expected sales
(average probability times the (new) price) by increasing, decreasing or keeping the
current price. Figure8 contains the flowchart of this process.
Withmultiple firms and sufficiently discriminative consumers, there is profit erosion
and eventually even a (marginal) loss to be expected. Firms will end up losing money,
go bankrupt and exit. As demand is inelastic, a remaining monopolist can increase its
price indefinitely. As such, we assume that a monopolist will not exit the industry. As
wewill see in Sect. 3.7, themonopolist will eventually have a high profitmargin, which
in turn attracts one or multiple entrants that will restore regular price competition.
3.6 Consumer demand and substitution–diffusion
The temporal pattern in consumer demand for new products is described by the classi-
calBass (1969)model. In thismodel, potential adopters of a newproduct are influenced
by both mass media communications and interpersonal word-of-mouth. Mass media
communications affect purchase decisions mostly in the early stage of the product life-
cycle, while interpersonal communications dominate after this (see Rogers 1995, pp.
79–82). In the model in this paper, consumers that have consumed their unit of prod-
uct have to buy a new one. In general, consumers have numerous products to choose
from, often even products of different generations. Macro-level substitution–diffusion
models extending Bass (1969) describe how products of newer generations gradually
diffuse in the consumer population and how these products thus substitute the products
of old generations (Norton and Bass 1987; Fisher and Pry 1971; Marchetti and Naki-
cenovic 1979). In these macro-level models consumers ultimately do not differ in their
propensities to adopt particular products (or even newer generations of products). In
reality, consumers differ in their purchasing power, the willingness-to-pay, exposure
to mass media, connections to consumers that may already have purchased a product,
etc. Rogers (1995) takes a micro-level perspective on adoption decisions and argues
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Fig. 9 The flowchart for the procedure how a focal consumer decides when to purchase what product of
which generation
that individual characteristics of consumers in combination with exposure through
mass media and word-of-mouth determines the actual adoption propensity. In Rogers’
perspective consumers range from being ‘innovators’ with a high propensity to adopt
new products to ‘laggards’ that are reluctant to adopt. Rogers’ perspective also allows
modeling of micro-level phenomena such as Veblen’s conspicuous consumption and
bandwagon dynamics (cf. Leibenstein 1950).
To reproduce the demand dynamics in the product life-cycle, the demand model
in our neo-Schumpeterian model features an initial ‘mass launch’ for each product
followed by a relatively autonomous substitution–diffusion due to ‘word-of-mouth’
of heterogeneous consumers. Figure9 contains the flowchart of how a focal consumer
decides when to purchase what product of which generation. The mechanisms and
variables in this flowchart are explained in the following subsections.
3.6.1 Product choice and word-of-mouth
Through word-of-mouth, a consumer learns about the existence and performance of
products. We assume that, upon having to buy a new unit of generation g, a consumer
has talked to Q other consumers, each currently consuming a product that is still
produced. Of the products of each of these Q consumers, the focal consumer knows the
performance (see Eq.1) and the current price. We follow consumer choice literature in
which consumers care for the value-for-money. The value-for-money is operationally
defined most commonly as the ratio of quality and price (Sweeney and Soutar 2001).
Here, we define the value-for-money of a product as:
v = q
q∗ p
. (3)
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The value-for-money is in essence how much value (performance q) the consumer
gets per dollar (price p). We normalize q ∈ (0, 1] by dividing by q∗, the highest
performance yet found, to make the payoff independent of the absolute performances.
Given that q/q∗ reflects the value of the product to consumers, we operationally refer
to this ratio (after multiplying with a scalar W = 150) as the willingness-to-pay.
Given that the focal consumer is not perfectly rational, nor perfectly informed,
and makes errors in assessing the performance of products, we assume that the focal
consumer does not pick the product that maximizes the value-for-money, but picks a
product according to the discrete choice model. The discrete choice model is ubiqui-
tous in economics, psychology, marketing, etc. and specifies how a consumer picks a
particular product probabilistically from a set of products based on the utilities of these
products (McFadden 1974; Train 2002; Anderson et al. 1992). In linewith our case, we
have the focal consumer favor the product recommended by consumer i ∈ {1, . . . , Q}
according to the following multinomial logit formula:
pi := e
γ vi
∑Q
j=1 eγ v j
.
The scaling parameter γ ≥ 0 in this discrete choice probability specifies the preference
of consumers for products with high value-for-money. If γ → ∞, consumers pick the
product with the highest value-for-money and are pure maximizers, while, if γ ↓ 0,
consumers pick a product uniform randomly and do not care about value-for-money.
3.6.2 Consumption rate
In many neo-Schumpeterian models, consumers buy a unit of product every period.
However, in that case, diffusion–substitution is rapid and themarket shares of products
(and firms) evolves highly disruptive. However, we seek to reproduce the product life-
cycle dynamics including the gradual emergence of a dominant design and profit
erosion. As such, we assume that consumers differ in how quickly they consume a
unit of product and, hence, how often they need to buy a new unit of product. We
implement this by having each consumer j consume a product at a rate r j uniform
randomly drawn from {r/(1 + rρ), . . . , r, . . . , r/(1 − rρ)} (or, alternatively, having
each consumer j purchase a unit after a number of periods uniform randomly drawn
from {1/r − ρ, . . . , 1/r, . . . , 1/r + ρ}). Hereby ρ ∈ N+ smaller than 1/r and r > 0
the average consumption rate.
3.6.3 Product launch and willingness-to-adopt
A firm launches a product by starting a mass media campaign persuading a fixed
number of random consumers to purchase its product. These consumers will start to
inform other consumers, thus potentially generate new demand for the product. How-
ever, apart from having different rates of consumption, consumers also have a different
willingness to adopt a newly launched generation of products. Rogers (1995) classifies
consumers as innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards,
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whereby innovators buy products of a newgeneration right after the launch (e.g. bought
a smartphone in 2007), while laggards are the last consumers in a population to buy
a new product (e.g. have not yet bought a smartphone in 2015). The differences in
Rogerian adoption willingness is the primary cause of the gradual substitution.
We implement this by drawing the willingness R j of a consumer j from N (μ, σ )
withμ = 3σ . For R j close to zero, consumer j is an innovator, for R j close toμ+3σ ,
the consumer is a laggard. With Tjg the point in time when consumer j is informed of
a product of generation g, consumer j is willing to buy a product of generation g as of
time t = Tgj + R j . Once a consumer has finished its current unit of product (possibly
of an old generation g′), and the consumer has to buy a new unit of product, the
consumer purchases a product of the newest generation he is willing to buy. Under the
assumption of availability of products of yet discovered generations (which is ensured
due to our entry criteria), all first-buyers have purchased their first unit of product of
generation g in approximately 6σ/r periods after the launch.
3.7 Entry and exit
Aparticularly distinct element of neo-Schumpeterianmodels is population-level learn-
ing by (i) deselection of evolutionary unfavorable strategies due to exit of firms and
(ii) active propagation of apparently favorable strategies due to entry of firms imitating
strategies of existing firms.
Upon the initialization of the first run of an industry, there is a fixed number of firms
that immediately enters. To prevent favoring a particular strategy, we initialize A firms
with all A combinations of integration and outsourcing before and after the emergence
of the dominant design. From that moment onward, firms enter and exit the industry
fully endogenously. A firm exits the industry if its capital drops below the bankruptcy
level (zero). However, we assume that a monopolist succeeds in persuading creditors
not to file for bankruptcy. Given the inelasticity of demand, the monopolist can raise
its prices (and the pricing heuristic depicted in Fig. 8 in Sect. 3.5 ensures it does), and
with the increase in profit margin, entry becomes attractive for potential entrants again.
Once a new firm enters the industry, the industry no longer is a monopoly, and the old
exit conditions are restored.
Following Nelson and Winter (1982), we assume that there is always a firm wait-
ing outside the industry for the industry conditions to meet its entry criteria to then
enter. Each period, the potential entrant (imperfectly) imitates the strategy of the firm
with the highest discounted cumulative capital. Upon imitation, the potential entrant
changes the governance strategy in 5% of the cases. This constitutes local search
in the governance strategy. Following this strategy, the potential entrant determines
whether it becomes entrepreneur or manufacturer and whether it would then enter or
not according to the criteria on profit margin and design dominance given below.
We follow the characterizations of manufacturing firms over the product life-cycle
of Utterback and Abernathy (1975) and Klepper (1996). In the early phase of the PLC,
the entrants are small, flexible, and innovative firms (‘entrepreneurs’) that tolerate
high uncertainty to reap high profit margins. In the growth and mature phases of the
PLC, the entrants are big, capital intensive production houses (‘manufacturers’) that
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reap low profit margin with dedicated production equipment under low uncertainty.
Operationally, we assume that entrepreneurs are willing to enter when (i) the profit
margin for the newest generation of products is high, (ii) the design dominance in that
generation is low, and (iii) there are not too many competitors. In this case, there are
considerable market and technological opportunities. We assume that a manufacturer
enters when (i) the profit margin (for the latest generation of products) is not too
low, (ii) the design dominance in that generation is already relatively high (‘limited
technological uncertainty’), and (iii) there are only a few competitors. In this case, the
manufacturer can recover investments while it is unlikely that a switch in production
is required. The entry criteria revolve around the profit margin and design dominance.
For the design dominance statistic, we follow many neo-Schumpeterian models with
entry and use a concentration index for generation g:
H2g =
∑
i∈Mg s
2
i
S2
, (4)
where si with i ∈ Mg is the market share of the i th product of generation g on the
market (possibly offered by more than one firm), Mg is the index set of products of
generation g currently on the market, and S is a normalization constant9 (over all gen-
erations). We compute this H for each generation g of products on the market. Given
the volatility of si , particularly in the onset phase, we have firms use an exponentially
smoothened Hˆ ← hH +(1−h)Hˆ with smoothing rate h = 1%. For the profit margin
per generation, we use the weighted average of the profit margins of all products of
that generation. We again have firms use an exponentially smoothened average profit
margin Pˆ as there is volatility due to introduction and withdrawal of products. Given
the different tolerances for number of competitors, the entry rates for entrepreneurs
andmass-manufacturers differ. Entrepreneurs enter with probability e(x) = 1/x (with
x the number of firms) if Pˆ > Pe and Hˆ < He. Manufacturers enter with probability
e(x) = a/(1 + x) with 0 < a < 1 if Pˆ > Pm and Hˆ > Hm .
3.8 Cost structure
We treat the cost structure as a mediating variable.We pick a cost structure that closely
meets the classical product life-cycle notions of entrepreneurial activities before and
mass-manufacturing activities after the emergence of the dominant design, see Utter-
back and Abernathy (1975). We assume that an entrepreneur runs a job shop, which
is a flexible production facility that facilitates switching to making another product at
relatively low costs. However, production in a job shop relies on generic tools rather
then specialized equipment, is labor intensive, and requires relatively skilled and thus
expensive employees. Moreover, the batch size is relatively small such that there are
limited positive scale economies. All in all, job shops have high unit production costs.
9 We do not pick S2 = (∑i si )2. In our case, si need not sum up to 1 as there may be potential adopters that
still need to do their first purchase. As we use H to reflect market opportunities, we rather take S = r N ,
where r N is the average demand per period (in number of consumers) with all repeat-buyers. Due to
first-buys and future peaks in sales due to launches, the H may be temporarily higher than 1.
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In contrast, a mass-manufacturer has dedicated production equipment, a relatively
low number of employees to run the plant, and thus comparatively low labor costs.
A mass-manufacturer produces big batches to reap positive scale economies and thus
has low unit production costs. However, given the dedicated production equipment,
there are high production switching costs.
Moreover, the vertical governance form affects the immediate production costs.
Vertically specialized system producers incur transaction costs to contact, contract,
and control suppliers as opposed to in-house production. Firms also incur costs when
changing the governance form. Integration requires investments in production facili-
ties, while these facilities are scrapped or divested upon outsourcing. In order to ensure
that firms are quickly acquiring an evolutionary beneficial governance strategy dur-
ing simulation runs, we reduce noise in firms’ financial performance caused by cost
particularities by assuming that firms in each of the tiers face the same cost structure.
To prevent further escalation in the number of parameters, we assume that the manu-
facturing costs in the up- and downstream tiers are equal and only depend on whether
the firm runs a job shop or dedicated mass-manufacturing equipment. However, we
do assume that the system producers in the downstream tier incur the transaction costs
for purchasing components from the vertically specialized component producers in
the upstream tier.
Apart from these periodic manufacturing costs, there are costs of incremental
research, imitation, and radical research.We assume that costs for incremental research
and imitation are negligible relative to costs of radical research. The costs for radical
research are set so high that any firm can only produce a few commercially unsuc-
cessful radical products before going bankrupt.
The parameter values used in the standard simulation runs are provided in “Appen-
dix 1”. In simulation experiments, we have validated mediating effects of these costs
on the governance forms emerging, e.g. if governance change becomes extremely
expensive, the emerging strategy is to stick with the current governance form. For an
elaborate discussion on the parameter choices, see Sect. 4.1.
4 Results
In this section, we present, analyze, and interpret the simulation results. In Sect. 4.1,
we discuss our parameter choices and how our model reproduces the stylized facts of
a product life-cycle. In Sect. 4.2, we present experimental results on how imitability
and complexity (as inverse of substitutability) affect the emerging governance forms
in the era of ferment and the era of incremental change. We statistically analyze and
conceptually interpret the simulation results, and compare them with our theoretical
predictions.
4.1 Analysis of the simulated industry evolution
In this subsection, we cross-validate the simulation results with common stylized
facts in evolutionary economics for industry evolution under homogeneous demand.
We start off with a discussion of the parameter values chosen. We then establish that
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our simulation model of the product life-cycle indeed produces results that feature
consecutive product life-cycles with eras of ferment and incremental change with the
common stylized facts. We then discuss the effects of our parameter choices on the
stylized life-cycles.
4.1.1 Parameter settings
The parameter values for the cost structure, capability landscape, demand and pric-
ing modules, and strategy parameters have been attuned to one another to ensure
that the simulation results feature common stylized facts. In this parameter attuning,
we balanced the ratio of feasible capabilities (tuned by the landscape parameters), the
periodic manufacturing costs, and possible revenue (as tuned by number of customers,
maximum willingness-to-pay, diffusion–substitution rate, and price adjustment rate).
The conceptual explanation is that if there are fewer feasible capabilities, firms have
to search longer, the average search costs per discovery are higher, such that the total
revenue must be higher to ensure that at least some firms succeed in recovering the
search costs. In fact, during experimentation with the market and pricing modules
determining the revenue and the technology landscape module determining the aver-
age search trajectory length, we noticed that the parameter settings are relative rather
than requiring a particular absolute setting. Ultimately, we picked parameter values
that have an ‘economically sensible interpretation’ yet maintain an acceptable com-
putation time. To this end, we limited the market size to 4000 consumer agents. More
consumers slows down simulation runs substantially. Using this market size, we then
picked the willingness-to-pay, search costs, and initial capital endowments. Given the
development of capital, we tuned the fraction of feasible capabilities in the landscape
search module and the scale and tail of the performance levels. After selecting the
value for these parameters, there are only a few parameters left to specify.
We pick values for the parameters for the search strategy (imitation, exploration,
radical search), adoption of newly found products, and entry, to have an ‘economically
sensible’ interpretation.With regard to imitation, our idea is that firmswill only engage
in the—possibly lengthy—imitation process if the performance is more than y%better
than the firms currently own top products. As imitation will inevitably mean that this
product is also taken into production, and production switching is argued to be more
costly for manufacturers, the improvement for manufactures must be even greater than
for entrepreneurs. Something similar holds for discovered products in recombination
of capabilities: if a product is not more than z% better than a firm’s top product, the
firm will not take it into production because consumers have only a small probability
of buying it.
In our operational definition of entry and parameter choices, we have ensured that
firms will not enter if the profit margin is too low or if the design dominance is too
high. Even if a firm succeeds in finding a top product that consumers switch to, the
expenses may not be recovered before other firms find a radical breakthrough. In our
operational definition of radical search and parameter choices, we have ensured that
firms will start radical search if the profit margin is very low and the design dominance
is very high. After all, there are then only limited opportunities to make a profit in
this generation of product technology. In our operational definition of the business
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strategy and parameter choices, we have ensured that firms will not switch to mass-
manufacturing facilities whenever they are expected to have to switch production
due to technological turmoil. After extensive experimentation, we picked the decision
thresholds as specified in “Appendix 1”.
4.1.2 Stylized facts reproduced
The simulation results are externally valid in that—for our choice of parameters—our
model robustly produces the stylized facts of the product life-cycle for homogeneous
demand: swarm-in/shake-out of firms, product turmoil followed by emergence of a
dominant design, profit erosion, and triggering of radical research.
For the illustration, we initialize our application to simulate an industry evolution
for X = 10,000 periods. We set the independent variables imitability i = 0.025 and
complexity x = 4.0, and—anticipating results discussed later—preset the governance
strategy to integration in the era of ferment andvertical specialization in the era of incre-
mental change. The simulation results are plotted in Fig. 10. The vertical bars (here at
about periods 3750 and 7250) in all subfigures signify radical innovation punctuations
at which an era of ferment starts. The era of incremental change is associated with a
high level of concentration of particular products. Figure10c contains square curves
(different colors only for clarity) for the life-spans and performances of the various
products on the market. During the intervals of roughly [0, 2000] and [3750, 5000]
there are many product introductions and removals, and the performance levels of
these products varies much but tends to increase. During the intervals [2000, 3750]
and [5000, 7250], there are only very few product introductions and there is one ‘top
product’ that persistently dominates. Figure10e contains the curves of the smoothened
design dominance (see Eq.4 in Sect. 3.7). We have three curves (with different colors
for clarity) starting at the radical innovation punctuations, each indicating the domi-
nance of one generation of product technology. We see that the curves start low, rise
steeply, and then level off when the top product technology starts to dominate. On
the basis of these simulation results, we argue that our simulation model reproduces
the stylized fact that there is technological turmoil in the era of ferment followed by
design dominance followed by the era of incremental change.
Figure10a contains the curves of the number of firms. The blue dotted curve is
the total number of firms. The purple dashed curve is the number of integrated firms.
The khaki continuous line is the number of system assemblers, while the green dot-
dashed line is the number of component suppliers. Right after the radical innovation
punctuations at period 0, 3750 and 7250, there is a steep increase of the total number
of agents. With the design dominance—plotted in Fig. 10e—approaching 1, and the
technological turmoil almost over (see the intervals mentioned above), the (total)
number of firms steeply drops.We also see that the firms switch their governance form
from vertical integration to vertical specialization. On the basis of these simulation
results, we argue that our simulation model reproduces the stylized fact that there is
a swarm-in of firms after a radical breakthrough and a shake-out around the moment
that one or a few particular product technologies start(s) to dominate.
Figure10f contains plots of the smoothened average profit margin of products on
the market, per generation. We see that there is a very steep rise just after the radical
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Fig. 10 Plots of various statistics of an industry evolution with three life-cycles. A detailed description of
the figures and the curves is found in Sect. 4.1.2. a Number of firms of each type. b Number of firms per
business strategy. c Performance. d Capital of the firms. e Design dominance Hˆ . f Average (smoothened)
profit margin
breakthrough, to then decrease and approach zero. We see three consecutive curves
(with different colors for clarity), one for every generation of product technology.
The steep increase is caused by the fact that we use the smoothened average profit
that starts at 0. As explained in Sect. 3.5, the price of the first product of a particular
generation is equal to the maximumwillingness-to-pay p∗. Note that the average price
for products of a certain generation is decreasing, while Fig. 10c indicates the product
performance is increasing. The temporary increase in profit margin around 4000 is due
to a monopolist raising its price for (inelastic) demand from consumers that are still
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consuming an old generation product (see Sect. 3.5). On the basis of these simulation
results, we argue that our simulation model reproduces the stylized fact that there is
profit erosion due to price competition.
There are two figures that are not immediately related to the stylized facts. Fig-
ure10b contains the curves of the number of firms per business strategy (entrepreneur,
manufacturer). The blue dotted curve is the total number of firms, the purple dashed
curve the number of entrepreneurs, and the khaki continuous curve the number of
manufacturers. We see that endings of the eras of ferment (around periods 2000 and
5000) coincide with the switching of firms from the entrepreneurial to the mass-
manufacturing business strategy.
Figure10d contains curves of the capital for each firm. The colors of the curves
differ to be able to distinguish one from the other. For some firms, the capital increases
first and only after some time starts to decrease. Some firms exist over multiple product
life-cycles. Other firms fail to realize a (substantial) market share and exit shortly after
entry.
4.1.3 Effects of parameter changes on the stylized product life-cycle
At present, we have tuned the parameters for the cost structure, technology landscape,
demand and pricing modules, and strategy parameters to ensure that the simulation
results feature the stylized facts as described above. Neo-Schumpeterian models lend
themselves for treating these parameters as mediating variables and to study the effect
of these parameters on the industry evolution. Given the number of parameters in our
model, we cannot discuss all possible variations.
As discussed in detail in Sect. 4.1.1, there is a relative balance between the ratio of
feasible capabilities (tuned by the landscape parameters), the periodic manufacturing
costs, and possible revenue (as tuned by number of customers, maximumwillingness-
to-pay, diffusion–substitution rate, and price adjustment rate). If we alter the relative
number of peaks in the technology landscape by changing N , D, this has obvious
implications. For instance, increasing N or D requires longer search, and firms thus
incur higher search costs before finding feasible capabilities, and thereby more bank-
ruptcies (and more entries, see Sect. 3.7). Simulation studies revealed that the number
of consumers and maximum willingness-to-pay p∗ lengthen the product life-cycle.
The underlying cause arguably is that the total market revenue increases. Decreasing
the number of consumers in the price poll increases the volatility in pricing. Lowering
the profit margin at which firms start doing radical research will extend the era of
incremental change of the product life-cycle. Other parameters, like the transaction
and periodic operating costs, merely change the slope of the capital curves.
The simulation outcomes consistently feature the stylized facts of the product life-
cycle for different, non-extreme values of imitability and complexity (substitutability).
However, the higher the complexity, the more detrimental technological distance
between component and system is, and the lower the average product performance
becomes.As the probability of bankruptcy relates to the relative product performances,
the market concentration is lower in case of high than is in case of low complexity.
The differences in revenue between firms drop with complexity and there are fewer
big players. Furthermore, the lower imitability, the longer imitation takes, the more
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Fig. 11 Governance patterns emerging in our simulation for low and high imitability and low and high
complexity (high and low substitutability). Row (column): type of governance form picked in the era of
ferment (incremental change)
firms with top products appropriate the value of their products. These firms with top
products will thus grow a bigger market share and gain more capital, which culminates
in a more concentrated industry.
4.2 Governance patterns
We report the findings of extensive simulation runs for four combinations of imitability
(low i = 0.025/high i = 0.125) and complexity (low x = 0/high x = 8) and
provide statistical analysis of the governance patterns emerging. For each of these
four combinations, we simulate the industry evolution for 50,000 periods, and for 100
different seed values. For each seed value, we take the governance strategy with the
highest (discounted) capital stock at the end of these 50,000 periods and register the
governance form in both the eras of ferment and incremental change.We thus construct
a 2 × 2 contingency table with the governance form in the era of incremental change
on the X -axis and the governance form in the era of ferment on the Y -axis. Figure11
contains a 2× 2 table with the four scenarios for the particular settings for imitability
and complexity, with the contingency table of the simulation results in each cell of
this table. We first discuss the statistics used and then the simulation outcomes, their
statistical analysis, and the interpretation thereof.
4.2.1 Statistics used
To test whether firms prefer one or the other governance form in either one of the eras
(ferment and incremental change), we point out that under the null hypothesis of no
preference, the count data follows a Binomial distribution with p = 12 . Suppose that
we run the simulation n times and find that the superior governance strategy is no
times to outsource and ni times to integrate (with n = no + ni ). The probability of
this observation (no, ni ) under H0 is equal to
( n
no
)
pn .
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The P-value of observing (no, ni ) or a more extreme outcome under the null-
hypothesis is defined as P(B < min{no, ni } | H0) with B ∼ Bin(n, 12 ). The P-values
are reported in Fig. 11, where prow (pcol) is the P-value for a preference for one or
the other governance form in the era of ferment (era of incremental change).
To test whether the emergence of the dominant design changes the choice of firms
to outsource or integrate, we use McNemar’s Chi square statistic χ2 = (n12−n21)2n12+n21
for matched-pair homogeneity. McNemar’s non-parametric test based on this statistic
signals whether or not there are significantly many counts in the off-diagonal cells.
The χ2 values in Fig. 11 indicate whether or not there is a significant change in pref-
erence from outsourcing to integration or vice versa. With one degree of freedom, the
McNemar Chi square statistic χ2 for matched-pair homogeneity leads to rejection of
H0 of equality if χ2 > 3.84 (5% significance level).
In addition, we use McNemar’s statistic to test whether—within the same era—a
certain change in parameter value also changes the preference for a certain governance
form. We do so by running the simulation with exactly the same parameter settings
and seed value, changing only this one parameter (here, complexity x or imitability
i). Table3 presents the results.
4.2.2 Statistical findings and interpretation
In Table2, we see that the dominant pattern is to (i) outsource in the era of incremen-
tal change (for occasional recombination and upstream scale economics) and (ii) to
integrate under low substitutability and to outsource under high imitability in the era
of ferment.
In the era of incremental change, firms are significantly often vertically specialized
(low pcol values) regardless of imitability or complexity/substitutability. In Table3,
we see that complexity decreases the propensity to outsource: if complexity is higher,
incompatibilities with a newly discovered complement are more likely, so the benefit
of being able to substitute is lower. Interestingly, imitability mediates the effect of
increasing complexity. If imitability is low, there is significantly less outsourcing
(more integration) when complexity increases. The conceptual interpretation is that,
given that it takes—in expectation—many periods to imitate a competing product,
Table 2 McNemar statistics on change in vertical governance strategy from the era of ferment to the era
of incremental change for different levels of complexity and imitability
Complexity Imitability Era McNemar χ2
Ferment Incremental change
x = 0 i = 0.025 55% outsources 85% outsources χ2 = 26.5
i = 0.125 87% outsources 93% outsources χ2 = 3.0
x = 8 i = 0.025 84% integrates 74% outsources χ2 = 58.0
i = 0.125 75% integrates 91% outsources χ2 = 62.2
With one df, the McNemar test rejects H0 (no change) if χ2 > 3.84 (5% significance level)
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Table 3 McNemar statistics on change in vertical governance strategy upon a change in capability regime
parameter value
Value fixed
parameter
Change in value
controlled parameter
Era for which test is conducted
Ferment Incremental change
x = 0 i = 0.025 → 0.125 More outsourcing χ2 ≈ 17.0 No sign. diff. χ2 ≈ 0.529
x = 8 i = 0.025 → 0.125 No sign. diff. χ2 ≈ 3.60 More outsourcing χ2 ≈ 7.26
i = 0.025 x = 0 → 8 More integration χ2 ≈ 4.57 More integration χ2 ≈ 11.1
i = 0.125 x = 0 → 8 More integration χ2 ≈ 46.0 No sign. diff. χ2 ≈ 2.91
With one df, the McNemar test rejects H0 (governance forms are not affected by the change in regime
property) if χ2 > 3.84 (5% significance level)
the value of an integrated product can be appropriated. For high imitability, i =
0.125, the integrated product is imitated near instantly, the value is not appropriated
by the inventor, so developing an integrated solution is less attractive, which further
discourages integration (although not significantly).Moreover, the integratedfirmdoes
not enjoy the benefits of being able to switch to a newly discovered complement (or
being switched to in case of a component supplier). Particularly under low complexity,
a specialized supplier with a top component enjoys scale economies and so do his
customers. Conclusively, firms prefer outsourcing in the era of incremental change.
However, there is less outsourcing whenever complexity increases, particularly when
the value of synergistically attuned products can be appropriated more (i.e. under low
imitability).
In the era of ferment, there is no clear preference for either outsourcing or verti-
cal specialization. However, we see that firms vertically integrate more often with an
increase in complexity (also see Table3). The propensity to outsource more under low
complexity and integrate more under high complexity further polarizes with imitabil-
ity. The conceptual explanation is that with an increase in imitability, appropriability
and hence the value of integration decreases. Whenever complexity is higher, there is
more integration to overcome compatibility issues. So, the trade-off of high perfor-
mance plus exclusion/appropriation through integration and easy recombination and
decentralized search through specialization tilts in favor of vertical integration with
an increase in complexity. However, this is countered by an increase in imitability as
this lowers appropriability.
We find that costs mediate in the obvious direction. If transaction costs drop, there
is more outsourcing, especially in the era of incremental change. Furthermore, the
higher the costs of changing the governance form, the more firms stick to a single
governance form over both eras.
4.2.3 Comparing theoretical predictions with statistical results
Next, we compare our simulation results contained in Table4 with our hypotheses
contained in Table1.
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Table 4 Emerging governance forms in both eras subject to imitability and substitutability
Substitutability
Low (x = 8) High (x = 0)
Imitability
Low (i = 0.025) Integration for attuning and
exclusion followed by outsourcing
Indifference in era of ferment
followed by outsourcing
High (i = 0.125) Integration for attuning, followed by
outsourcing
Outsourcing in both eras
We see that whenever the effects of imitability and substitutability both indicate to
outsource or both indicate to integrate (i.e. the two on-diagonal cases), our simulation
results confirm that this effect occurs during the era of ferment. However, whenever
integration is predicted (the case with low substitutability and low imitability), that
the tendency to integrate is dominated by outsourcing during the era of incremental
change. Favorable cost differentials of outsourcing to a supplier with a top component
dominate the—as we already argued in Sect. 2.3—relatively weak factors in favor of
integration.Whenever the effects of imitability and substitutability are conflicting (i.e.
the two off-diagonal cases), there is theoretical ambiguity on the governance form.
We see that, in the era of incremental change, decentralized search and favorable cost
differentials dominate benefits of integration. Under high imitability and low sub-
stitutability, we see that in the era of ferment, under technological turmoil, there is
no significant preference for either integration or specialization. Under our parame-
ter choices, decentralized search by specialization gives about as much competitive
advantages as does appropriation through integration. As firms are entrepreneurs with
flexible job shops, there is no cost advantage of outsourcing.
4.2.4 Reproducibility and robustness checks
Anextensive number of runs for different seed values revealed that the results are repro-
duced for the parameter settings given in “Appendix 1”. In Sect. 4.1.1, we explained
that the number of feasible capabilities on the landscape, the periodic manufacturing
costs, and possible revenue are attuned to one another. Big changes to parameters
in either one of these modules will generally cause more variance in the simulation
outcomes and less significant results. The explanation of this increase in variance is
sought in the fact that disruptive change in parameters weakens the discriminative
power of the selection in the model. If costs increase or payoff decreases disruptively,
firms generally live shorter and have relatively few search steps, such that their survival
highly depends on ‘serendipitous’ discovery of capabilities. If costs decrease or pay-
off increases significantly, there are relatively few firms that go bankrupt, industries
get a low clockspeed, and there are only few ‘selective’ technology punctuations. In
both cases, there is considerable uncertainty in which strategy survives, and thereby
considerable variation in the emerging governance strategy.
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The values for the parameters of these modules are chosen such that the simulated
economy does not suffer weak selective power due to the longevity of the industry, nor
suffers weak discriminative power due to mostly accidental survival. Experimentation
runs have revealed that incremental change to parameters has only moderate effects on
the simulation outcomes. That said, given the parameter values for thesemodules, there
still are parameters that mostly affect the costs and chances of finding top capabilities
depending on the governance strategy. The most obvious parameter is the transaction
costwhen buying components upstream. Simulation studies revealed a dominant effect
of transaction costs: if transaction costs drop, there is more outsourcing, especially
in the era of incremental change. Other obvious parameters are the costs of vertical
integration and outsourcing. The higher these costs, the more firms stick to a single
governance form over both eras.
5 Discussion and conclusions
Following recent endeavors in economic and organizational literature, we studied the
governance forms in the different stages of the homogeneous product life-cycle. In this
literature, there is, particularly, disagreement over the governance form to be preferred
in the early stage after a technological breakthrough and before the emergence of a
dominant design. We postulated that differences in the governance strategies are due
to differences in the capability regime. We presented an advanced neo-Schumpeterian
agent-based simulation model of a two-tier industry that robustly reproduces the styl-
ized facts of industry evolution with consecutive product life-cycles. We subsequently
used this model to study emerging governance patterns by firms evolutionary learn-
ing the governance strategy for different levels of imitability and substitutability of
the capabilities. The simulation results confirm that there is no uniform governance
pattern and that the preferred governance form strongly depends on imitability and
substitutability in interaction. In the era of incremental change, firms prefer vertical
specialization, particularly when substitutability is high. The higher substitutability
(lower complexity), the more valuable is flexibility to recombine with new comple-
mentary capabilities and the higher (potential) upstream scale advantages. Higher
imitability causes lower appropriability so further discourages integration. Transac-
tion costs have a dominant mediating effect on the governance form.
In the era of ferment, governance preferences are more ambiguous. Under high
imitability, there is limited appropriability, and firms do not vertically integrate to
develop products with superior performance. Nonetheless, firms do then not automat-
ically vertically specialize. After all, under higher complexity (low substitutability),
there generally is more incompatibility of component and system such that the com-
binatorial advantage of vertical specialization decreases, and hence firms are more
likely to be vertically integrated.
Thefindings in thiswork enhance our understanding of howdifferent industriesmay
have different governance forms in different stages of the product life-cycle, and then
particularly in the era of ferment. In this early stage of an industry, firms are unlikely to
vertically integrate if technology is highly imitable or highly substitutable, which is for
instance the case in low-tech industries with modular components or relatively easily
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separable production steps, e.g. apparel, textiles, and footwear industries. However,
even in competitive industries like desktop computers and mobile phones with rather
modular technology, there may be instruments like patents to discourage imitation
and appropriate the value of innovations. In this case, most firms vertically specialize,
yet some firms vertically integrate to develop top performing, integrated products. In
industries with systemic products with technologically dedicated components, like the
aircraft and lithography equipment industries, there is limited substitutability. In this
case, there is vertical integration through research joint ventures.
We also find that the cost structure in up- and downstream industries mediate the
governance forms in predictable ways, e.g. strong economies of scale combined with
high substitutability in the upstream industry will make downstream firms reluctant
to backward integrate.
We have not addressed actual differences in the properties of individual capabil-
ities or changes in these properties. However, as mentioned above, standardization
and modularization at industry level will change the substitutability and thereby the
propensity to vertically integrate in the early phases of subsequent product life-cycles.
Further research should shed light on how changes in the capability regime affect the
governance pattern.
Wearewell aware of the stylized nature and the homogeneity of firmstrategies, costs
etc. This homogenization allowsunambiguously assigning the evolutionary emergence
of the governance strategy to properties of the capability regime (and the performance
of the strategy itself) rather than other particularities of the firms that we should then
also study and report.Moreover, we have ‘fixed’ the firm behavior and costs before and
after the emergence of the dominant design to ensure convergence in the simulation
results rather than having to cope with sustained noise and possibly inconclusive
simulation results. Further research should shed light on the role of additional strategies
in emerging industry evolution and governance patterns.
Moreover, further research is needed to understand governance patterns in product
life-cycles with heterogeneous products in which we expect differentiation in the
product-market strategies, e.g. vertical integration to horizontally differentiate from
competitors. Another interesting extension is to model industries with firms at even
more tiers.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix 1: Parameter settings
Technology landscape parameter settings
We have the following parameter settings to specify the number of capabilities, the
number of feasible capability distribution, and the distribution of the capability per-
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formances.
Number of abilities per capability N 6
Number of types of abilities/skills/techniques D 5
Number of feasible capabilities per landscape C 100
Capability performance distribution (scale, tail) α, β 3.0, 0.5
Parameter settings for macro-economic variables
We have the following parameter settings in the initialization of and (plotted) macro-
level metrics during the simulation of an industry.
Initial population size A 4
Discounting/expon. smoothing rate capital 0.001
Exponential smoothing rate design dominance 0.003
Exponential smoothing rate profit margin, market concentration 0.01
Strategy parameter settings
We have the following parameter settings for the decisions that firms take to either
explore, imitate or conduct radical innovation
Imitation performance threshold (entr./manuf.) 1.05, 1.15
Min. improvement of top product required (entr./manuf.) 0.8, 0.9
Required minimum profit threshold to enter (entr./manuf.) 0.15, 0.05
Maximum design dominance entry (entr./manuf.) 0.8, 0.8
Radical search profit margin threshold 0.02
Radical search dominant design threshold 0.90
Business strategy threshold (margin) 0.80(±0.06)
Strategy imitation failure rate 0.05
Demand/diffusion–substitution parameter settings
We have the following parameter setting to specify the market demand and its devel-
opment due to substitution–diffusion.
Market size in number of customers M 4000
Number of customers upon product launch 150
Product panel size Q 4
Discrete choice choosiness γ 600
123
Capability-based governance patterns over. . .
Replacement rate r 0.05
Standard deviation Rogerian adoption willingness μ 30
Maximum willingness-to-pay p∗ 150
Capital/costs parameter settings
We have to the following parameter settings to specify the capital the firms have when
entering, and the costs that firms make periodically and for certain actions.
Unit production costs (entr./manuf.) 5, 2
Transaction costs per supplier relation 300
Periodic manufacturing costs per tier (entr./manuf.) 400, 850
Capital starting level 800k
Cost of production change (entr./manuf.) 0,−50k
Cost of radical search, imitation of next generation −400k,−200k
Cost of governance change (insourcing, outsourcing) −50k, 0
Pricing parameter settings
We have the following parameter settings to specify the polling that firms conduct to
adjust their price.
Poll panel size B 100
Investigated price change 0.00125
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